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1001 
THE VIRTUES OF MEDICARE  
Jill R. Horwitz* 
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles. By David A. Hyman. Washington, 
D.C.: Cato Institute. 2006. Pp. xviii, 138. Cloth, $14.95; paper $9.95.  
 
Most of us look forward to a heaven where people don’t get sick. But if 
they do, health care would be traded among fully informed patients and pro-
viders in perfectly competitive and frictionless markets. In that perfect 
world, sick citizens simply shop for doctors the way they shop for other 
consumer goods. The better doctors, like the most elegant hotel rooms and 
fanciest cars, would cost more than inferior doctors. Patients would consult 
their utility meters and, with appropriate attention to discounting over an 
infinite lifetime, choose accordingly. After each treatment, the patients 
would know the quality of their outcome and would accurately tell their 
friends in heaven whether they got a good deal on their appendectomy, by-
pass surgery, or what have you. 
Unfortunately, that’s not the way it works here in the corporeal world. 
Illness is messy. Medical treatment is complex. Knowledge is limited. Deci-
sions need to be made quickly. And, therefore, health care markets are a 
muddle. Enter Professor David Hyman.1 Posing as Underling Demon 666, 
Hyman has written a book-length letter to Satan about Medicare, the federal 
health insurance program for people age sixty-five and older.2 In the letter, 
Hyman explains that only one thing stands in the way of having heaven’s 
health care system here on earth: big government. 
The problem with Hyman’s view is that even without big government 
sticking its meddlesome finger into the pot, health care markets don’t work 
well. Health care markets are all about failures and, unfortunately, the stakes 
are high. That’s what makes health care devilish to provide and vexatious to 
regulate (and, incidentally, interesting to scholars). That’s also why I think 
                                                                                                                      
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research 
Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. Many thanks to Jim Driscoll-MacEachron, Sherry 
Glied, Don Herzog, Hyland Hunt, Bill Miller, Austin Nichols, Edward Parson, John Pottow, Peter 
Siegelman, Jonathan Skinner, Marc Spindelman, and Harry Swain for helpful comments on early 
drafts. 
 1. Professor and Galowich-Huizenga Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law. 
 2. Medicare also insures people under age sixty-five who are blind, disabled, or have end-
state renal disease. A few percent of the elderly are not eligible for Medicare because they do not 
qualify as a worker or dependent of a worker with at least forty quarters of Social Security earnings. 
Medicare is not to be confused with Medicaid, a joint state-federal program that provides health 
insurance to poor people, particularly children who make up almost half of its enrollees. Medicaid 
is, however, important for the elderly because “[a]lthough the elderly and people with disabilities 
make up just one-quarter of all Medicaid enrollees, they account for 70% of Medicaid spending.” 
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Medicaid Program at a Glance 1 
(2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-02.pdf. 
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that Hyman misses his target. Instead of aiming his considerable wit at 
Beelzebub’s bureaucrats, those policy planners whom he charges with de-
signing a system that was “dysfunctional from the get-go” (p. 10), he’d do 
better to recognize that his problems rest with the nature of health care and 
proceed from there. After all, sensible reform must be grounded in reality. 
That said, there is a lot to recommend Medicare Meets Mephistopheles. 
I’ll briefly touch on three of its virtues (and one of its vices) before consid-
ering Hyman’s argument. First, there is a lot of truth in this book. As with 
any program of this importance and scale, Medicare is riddled with serious 
troubles. Yes, Medicare spending is huge and it will shock many readers to 
learn how fast it is growing. Yes, policymakers, analysts, and all but a few 
scholars have paid inadequate attention to the program’s distributional con-
sequences. Yes, the new prescription drug plan is not sustainable. And the 
list goes on. Despite Hyman’s implication that rampant idiocy, greed, and 
corruption are behind these problems, many smart, honest, and hard-
working people are struggling to fix the problems he identifies. I know, I 
know, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Still, one need not 
abandon all hope before entering the realm of Medicare policy.  
Second, Hyman is extraordinarily knowledgeable about health care 
regulation and his exposition is succinct. The book is filled with informative 
and accurate summaries of Medicare’s complicated program design and 
related laws. The summaries of fraud and abuse law, for example, make my 
heart sing. I’ve seldom seen such an accessible and accurate primer. 
Third, the book identifies crucial issues raised by all large social pro-
grams, not just Medicare. For any large program, we need to know whether 
the benefits are worth the costs—both on average and at the margin. We also 
need to know how those costs are distributed—among young and old, 
healthy and sick, rich and poor.  
But that is not all we need to know. Although the book covers a vast ter-
rain, I wanted more. Hyman’s arguments only hint at an equally important 
matter for social policy. What should we do when such a program is, as it 
inevitably will be, imperfect? How should we balance various injustices? 
Hyman focuses on Medicare’s financing, oversight, and political problems. 
Yet his preferred design, one more oriented to the market, would generate 
plenty of its own injustice. Why is that better?3 
A word of warning: The book’s clever approach too often crosses into 
the facile, making Hyman’s argument hard to nail down. But if there is a 
thesis in this book—beyond that Medicare is big government and big gov-
ernment is bad—it is probably best summed up by Hyman’s claim that “the 
very existence of the Medicare program evoked and encouraged gluttony—
and the political consequence of that gluttony was a one-way ratchet that 
shifted the costs of the Medicare program to the working population and 
away from Medicare beneficiaries” (p. 41). However, Hyman’s refrain about 
                                                                                                                      
 3. I suspect that Hyman’s answer would rest on principles of libertarian political theory. 
Although such a debate is beyond the scope of this review, it may very well lie only slightly below 
what seem to be technical disagreements about social insurance arrangements. 
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Medicare’s irredeemable sins—it spends too much, for the wrong reasons, 
on second-rate stuff, and all from the pockets of the poor—tells a partial and 
partisan story. 
In addition to obscuring his insights, Hyman’s breezy style too often 
crosses into insult, mainly against mommy-party Democrats. Although ac-
knowledging that all politicians pander to voters, Hyman gratuitously asserts 
that “Democrats disproportionately emphasize Medicare in their appeals to 
the electorate, which is consistent with their basic position that the ‘highest 
purpose of government is to send people checks in the mail.’ ”4 Typical is the 
unfounded claim that “many of Medicare’s defenders react to even the 
slightest criticism of their favorite program with a ferocity that demonstrates 
that their enthusiasm has more to do with ideology than the actuarially 
sound/goo-goo [that is, good-government] approach they would insist on if 
we were talking about anything other than Medicare” (p. 103). Beleaguered 
Republicans are mainly guilty of the sin of anger, a reasonable response to 
their turncoat members who acted like Democrats in lustfully voting “to 
expand an out-of-control entitlement” (p. 65). In politics all sides engage in 
shallow and inconsistent argument. Yet it is principally Democrats and 
Medicare supporters that Hyman charges with substituting slogan for rea-
son. Despite these distractions, readers should press on.  
I. What’s a Few Billion Among Friends? 
Hyman starts with a sketch of Medicare’s vastness: “Covering approxi-
mately 42 million (primarily elderly) Americans, it funnels almost $340 
billion per year into the pockets of physicians, hospitals, clinical laborato-
ries, home health agencies, physical therapists, social workers, [and] 
pharmaceutical companies . . . .” (p. xvii). (I’ve heard about the billions lin-
ing the pockets of big-pharma execs, but social workers?) Of course, this 
money is not sent by the federal government to these professionals in the 
form of birthday gifts, but rather through reimbursement for providing ser-
vices to sick people.  
Predictions and polemics aside, Hyman is right that by any measure the 
United States spends a lot of money on health care. But Medicare is only 
part of the picture. Don’t forget that Medicaid spending is almost as high, 
and on top of that there is private insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
Hyman is also right that Medicare massively exceeded its initial cost projec-
tions. As Richard Epstein reports in his introduction, “By 1990, Satan had 
secured his pound of flesh: total hospital expenditures were more than six 
times those originally estimated in 1965” (p. xiv). Pretty soon even these 
dollars might come to look like pocket change. By 2050, Medicare spending 
alone is projected to increase to 9.2% of GDP from 2.9% today, both be-
                                                                                                                      
 4. P. 59. Here Hyman quotes Nicholas Lemann, America Right and Left, Atlantic 
Monthly, Apr. 1998, at 103, 108. Lemann’s article, however, does not attribute the view about 
government’s highest purpose to Democrats, but rather to a book he is reviewing. 
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cause of medical cost growth and the graying of America.5 Not everyone, 
however, is convinced that Medicare’s spending will continue to grow at 
current rates.6 
But Hyman didn’t even give the Devil his due. Medicare can be blamed 
for much of total U.S. health care spending. People spend more on medical 
care when they have insurance than when they don’t. But the spending 
growth is much greater when it comes in the form of a public insurance pro-
gram than through individual insurance coverage. In fact, Amy Finkelstein 
has estimated that Medicare’s effect on hospital spending is over six times 
larger than what the evidence from individual-level changes in health insur-
ance would have predicted. How can this be? Finkelstein explains that 
insuring a large percentage of the population leads to market-wide changes 
that go beyond those that would result from the mere aggregation of a bunch 
of individual decisions to buy insurance.7 The idea is that if you insure the 
elderly in one fell swoop, hospitals will respond to the promise of increased 
demand by entering new markets and adopting new practices, despite the 
high fixed costs of these activities. The more Medicare spends, the more we 
all spend. 
Why should we care how much money is spent on health care in the 
United States? Per capita health spending varies considerably (more than 
100 to 1) across nations.8 Ironically, spending on medical care is lower in 
                                                                                                                      
 5. David M. Cutler, The Potential for Cost Savings in Medicare’s Future, 2005 Health 
Aff. W5-R77, W5-R78, (web exclusive) http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.r77v1. 
 6. Cutler, for example, thinks that spending growth may decline, in large part because the 
Medicare population is getting healthier (e.g., lower smoking rates and better control of hyperten-
sion). See id. Growth rates may also go down if current trends in the compression of illness into the 
later years of life continue; this is because medical spending during the last year of life is twice as 
high for people who die young (ages sixty-five to sixty-nine) than for those who die very old (over 
ninety). Id. Finally, recent projections do not account for technological innovations, such as laparo-
scopic surgery, that are cheaper than current interventions. Id. at W5-R79. In addition, Medicare 
managed care will likely continue to grow because new retirees are more accustomed to managed 
care than past generations of retirees who were familiar only with traditional fee-for-service plans. 
For managed care enrollment rates, see Kaiser Family Found., Trends and Indicators in the 
Changing Health Care Marketplace § 2 ex.2.17 (2005), http://www.kff.org/insurance/ 
7031/print-sec2.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). Cf. Susan Bartlett Foote & Gwen Wagstrom  
Halaas, Defining A Future For Fee-For-Service Medicare, 25 Health Aff. 864, 864 (2006) (report-
ing that by 2013 upwards of eighty-four percent of Medicare enrollees are still predicted to choose 
fee-for-service over managed care, but suggesting ways in which care management can be imported 
into fee-for-service arrangements).  
 7. Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Intro-
duction of Medicare 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11619, 2005). 
Finkelstein reports as follows:  
Data from the National Health Expenditure Accounts indicate that real hospital expenditures 
grew by 63 percent between 1965 and 1970, compared to only 41 percent over the previous 
five years . . . . The smaller estimates . . . imply that Medicare can account for about one-third 
of the growth in hospital spending over this five year period or all of the above-average growth 
relative to the previous five years. 
Id. 
 8. William D. Savedoff, What Should A Country Spend On Health Care?, 26 Health Aff. 
962, 962 (2007). 
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countries with public systems than in countries with private systems.9 But 
people (and countries) have to spend their money on something. We spend a 
larger share of our money on the military (4.06% of GDP in 2005) than do 
France (2.60%)10 and Tuvalu (which doesn’t have a military to spend money 
on).11 Both Sweden (7.7% of GDP in 2004) and Swaziland (6.2%) spend 
more of their money on education than we do (5.7%).12 Accordingly, how 
much of GDP goes to health care can be understood as a matter of national 
choice, not whether the country can afford the bill.13 
Some economists have argued that our spending hasn’t been profligate, 
but rather shows good investment sense. David Cutler, for example, argues 
that we have gotten more than our money’s worth. Analyzing treatments as 
varied as neonatal care and anti-depressants, he demonstrates that people are 
living longer and healthier lives because medical care has gotten so much 
better.14 Without health insurance, very few sick people would be able to 
access this care. Robert Hall and Charles Jones claim that by the middle of 
the century we ought to spend more than thirty percent of GDP on health 
care.15 This is because while the marginal utility of consumption falls when 
we get richer, the marginal utility of spending to live longer does not. More 
intuitively, Hall and Jones ask, “As we get older and richer, which is more 
valuable: a third car, yet another television, more clothing—or an extra year 
of life?”16 The claim has real bite because the elderly are not only living 
longer lives, they are increasingly living healthier lives into very old age. So 
that extra year is increasingly likely to be spent healthily. 
There are, however, a few problems with this argument. First, when 
spending gets high enough—some think high enough will come by 2016 
when almost twenty percent of GDP will go to health spending17—we may 
start giving up spending money on other things that matter for our quality of 
life. It’s one thing if Americans can’t buy the next version of their favorite 
                                                                                                                      
 9. David M. Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in Handbook of Public Econom-
ics 2143, 2168 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). 
 10. Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 199, 586 (2006), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2007). 
 11. Id. at 569, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/tv.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 12. The World Bank, World Development Indicators § 2 tbl.2.10, at 86 (2006), avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table2-10.pdf. 
 13. Michael E. Chernew et al., Increased Spending on Health Care: How Much Can the 
United States Afford?, 22 Health Aff. 15 (2003). 
 14. David M. Cutler, Your Money or Your Life: Strong Medicine for America’s 
Health Care System (2004).  
 15. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 
122 Q.J. Econ. 39, 40 (2007). 
 16. Id. 
 17. John A. Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes Ob-
scure Part D’s Impact, 26 Health Aff. W242, W242 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/2/w242. 
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video game or the newest model SUV, it is quite another when a country 
must skimp on education, national defense, or housing to pay its health care 
bill. Second, all is well and good as long as productivity keeps going up and 
up and up. But what happens if it doesn’t?  Third, we aren’t getting all we 
could for the money we are spending on health care.18 However, because 
variations in spending patterns are so complex—additional spending in 
some regions is worth it and in others is not—you don’t improve the effi-
ciency of Medicare spending by simply refusing to buy the next dollar of 
health care.19 So we shouldn’t necessarily spend less; we should spend 
smarter. 
Hyman would also likely respond to the suggestion that Medicare 
spending is worth it by pointing out that what people do with their own 
money is their own business. Let them burn it if they want. The problem 
with Medicare is that it is “overwhelmingly . . . financed by taxpayers who 
are not receiving benefits from the Medicare program” (p. 17). Even if this 
is true, why is this so troubling? So what if everyone pays and the sick get 
treated? 
Hyman’s answer is that Medicare is insidious because it induces people 
to spend more money on health care than they otherwise would. People 
aren’t paying for health care out of their own pockets; they are using other 
people’s money, and spending other people’s money is fun. His argument 
blends together two distinct problems that I disentangle below: (1) moral 
hazard (with, for Hyman, the added insult that all this spending is buying a 
low-quality product) and (2) inequitable distribution. 
II. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is an inevitable cost of insurance. It occurs when an indi-
vidual consumes more than she otherwise would because she doesn’t have 
to pay all the costs of her consumption. People may be less careful when 
they are insured, such as driving a little less carefully when their auto insur-
ance includes payments for collision than if they had to pay for the full cost 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Inefficiency explains some, although not all, of why U.S. health spending is higher than 
health spending elsewhere. A summary of several studies suggests that relatively intensive medical 
treatment during hospital visits as well as expensive inputs like highly paid doctors and medical 
equipment are also to blame. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United 
States Is So Different From Other Countries, Health Aff., May–June 2003, at 89, 98. But there are 
inefficiencies in the U.S. system. Although this is not evidence of Medicare’s inefficiency, the fact 
that the United States both spends more money per capita and has the highest infant mortality rate 
and lowest life expectancy among high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries suggests health spending inefficiency. William C. Hsiao, Why Is a 
Systemic View of Health Financing Necessary?, 26 Health Aff. 950, 950 (2007). For examples of 
inefficient Medicare spending, see, for example, Jonathan S. Skinner et al., Is Technological Change 
In Medicine Always Worth It? The Case Of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 25 Health Aff. W34 
(2006) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/2/w34. 
 19. E.g., Skinner et al., supra note 18, at W41–W43 (showing that while there is consider-
able waste in spending, the efficiency of treatments vary considerably by location). Skinner and his 
coauthors suggest that a better bet for increasing efficiency is to identify effective treatments and use 
education and incentives to increase their use. 
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of the body work. Similarly, the argument goes, having health insurance 
may induce insureds to be less careful with their own health.20 More plausi-
bly, health insurance can cause patients to go to the doctor more often than 
they would otherwise because the additional care is relatively cheap when 
insurance covers the bill.  
Hyman thinks moral hazard is to blame for Medicare’s dramatic cost 
growth. Because they pay so much less than their medical care costs, bene-
ficiaries have become gluttons for medicine. Having insurance has made 
Medicare patients—not to mention the doctors who both order the care on 
their patients’ behalf and receive the payments—bad shoppers. Like diners 
who take that extra trip to the all-you-can-eat buffet, Medicare patients con-
sume too much care—more than the patient would have asked for had she 
paid the full bill. Strictly speaking, this conception of medical care under 
insurance is absolutely correct. There are some egregious examples of inef-
ficient, not to mention dangerous, care that patients buy and providers sell 
mainly because people have health insurance. I remember a few years back 
when MRI providers were targeting the “worried wealthy” by advertising 
full body scans at Valentine’s Day; presumably many of these were paid 
through insurance. 
Moral hazard arguments in the context of health care, however, are not 
entirely fitting. You don’t have to look hard to find evidence that people 
generally become patients because they are sick, not because they are in-
sured. Medical care isn’t very pleasant to consume. Aside from some 
cosmetic treatments that are generally not covered by insurance, you don’t 
see rich people giving their loved ones gifts of surgery—“Oh, darling, thank 
you so much for that weeklong stay in intensive care.” 
Measuring moral hazard in the health care context is notoriously hard. 
Doing it the usual way—looking at what people would consume absent in-
surance and deciding the rest is moral hazard—isn’t accurate. People 
consume more medical care when they are insured because they can’t afford 
it otherwise. If there were no insurance, only a very few of the roughly 
225,000 Medicare beneficiaries who have heart attacks each year would 
write a $25,000 check for the hospital costs of cardiac bypass surgery 
alone,21 never mind the physician, diagnostic and other related medical 
treatment, and pharmaceutical costs. Is that because these folks didn’t really 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Dhaval Dave and Robert Kaestner have found some evidence that being insured by 
Medicare reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behavior among beneficiaries. They also 
found that these moral hazard effects are smaller than the beneficial preventative effects of physician 
counseling that come with the increased contact with doctors because of Medicare coverage. Dhaval 
Dave & Robert Kaestner, Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence From Medicare 
33–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12764, 2006). The limits to this line of 
reasoning are discussed below. 
 21. Costs based on average Medicare reimbursement estimates for 2006. Guidant Corp., 
2006 FY Medicare Hospital Payment Changes Affecting CABG and Microwave Ablation, available 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20061029085712/http://www.guidant.com/reimbursement/cs_codes/ 
medicare_ip.shtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2007). For more detailed information for earlier years, see 
David M. Cutler et al., Pricing Heart Attack Treatments, in Medical Care Output and Produc-
tivity 305 (David M. Cutler & Ernst R. Berndt eds., 2001).  
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value their treatment at more than $25,000? Or is it because they can’t write 
such a check, even though they actually value the care they receive by much 
more than its cost? Health insurance induces patients to get the surgery, but 
in many cases that’s good, not bad. And it’s not evidence of moral hazard—
or gluttony, as Hyman calls it. Insurance lets sick people get access to very 
expensive medical care when they need it, and that’s what it’s supposed to 
do. 
Because a patient can’t write a check for intensive medical care, there-
fore, doesn’t mean that the patient’s purchase of the care with insurance is 
inefficient.22 (Nor does it necessarily mean that the purchase is efficient. 
Gee, I really value that new Ferrari at more than its price; perhaps the gov-
ernment should provide insurance for buying sport cars!) Therefore, we 
should not only ask whether people consume more than they otherwise 
would because they are insured, but also whether the care being provided is 
worth the cost. Unfortunately, that’s a still harder question to answer. It de-
pends on what patients are getting for all these payments as well as the 
opportunity costs of public spending. While Hyman is right that Medicare 
insurance has tempted patients to spend more than they would otherwise, 
that doesn’t mean the temptation is one that patients ought to resist. 
III. What Are we Getting for our Money? 
Hyman informs us that the Devil is thrilled with all this Medicare spend-
ing for two reasons. What we are getting from it is (1) a bunch more 
spending and (2) some lousy care. 
First, Hyman argues that Medicare’s reimbursement system is inflation-
ary. The old fee-for-service reimbursement system that paid physicians 
based on “usual, customary, and reasonable” charges led to skyrocketing 
payments (p. 20). Advances in reimbursement systems that did a better job 
of mimicking market prices (now almost twenty-five years old for hospital 
payments and fifteen years old for physician payments) are so filled with 
pathologies that they don’t work either (p. 21). 
What’s worse is that beneficiaries of this largess—doctors (who, by the 
way, are all private actors) and hospitals (the vast majority of which are also 
private)—deliver their Medicare patients care that is “highly mediocre over-
all, with some of it absolutely appalling” (p. 23). Hyman, who knows his 
stuff when it comes to health policy research, knows this because there are 
so many studies that identify “overuse, underuse, misuse, unexplained varia-
tions in treatment patterns, and outright errors” (p. 23).  
Jonathan Skinner and colleagues have found examples of “flat of the 
curve” spending—where more spending doesn’t yield more benefit—in 
some Medicare regions where doctors and hospitals are spending too much 
on expensive and ineffective care and too little on inexpensive and effective 
                                                                                                                      
 22. John A. Nyman, Is ‘Moral Hazard’ Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory, 
Health Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 194.  
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care.23 Throughout the book, Hyman refers to what can only be described as 
shocking geographic variation in patterns of hospital use, surgery, and medi-
cal spending. All this is true. One look at the Dartmouth Atlas of Health 
Care,24 which documents treatment variation, is enough to make patients 
very queasy.  
While citing a host of studies by health economists and policy analysts 
that identify problems in the Medicare program, he rejects their conclusions. 
Whereas researchers focus on particular examples of “defective incentives, 
poor information, inadequate monitoring, the state of medical science, non-
compliant patients, incompetent providers, and everything else one could 
imagine” (p. 23), Hyman would prefer that they conclude that the rot of in-
efficient spending and bad care lies with Medicare itself. In fact, Hyman 
cites one study to support his claim that Medicare is not only wasteful but 
also bad for the health of its beneficiaries (p. 25). Unfortunately, it says 
something quite different; though the study found a negative correlation 
between Medicare spending and quality, it identified the relatively high pro-
portion of specialists in the area as the root of the quality problem, not 
Medicare spending per se.25  
Based on an unexamined premise, Hyman assumes reducing govern-
ment involvement in health care provision will lead to more efficiency and 
higher quality. So how does Medicare compare to its alternatives? It’s very 
hard to tell. No neat case control study can be done because there is no rele-
vant control group. Almost all of old people who get the illnesses that 
Medicare pays to treat are covered by Medicare. There are plenty of studies 
comparing various experiments within Medicare, but none that would allow 
anyone to conclude that elderly patients would spend less or get higher qual-
ity care without it.26 Even so, there is plenty of evidence that there is lots of 
lousy privately provided medical care.27 There is also some evidence that 
Medicare is at least as good as private insurers at containing costs, maybe 
better.28 Admittedly, that’s not good enough. 
Some scholars find that all insurance, including Medicare and its private 
alternatives, has had only a small causal effect on health outcomes; the effects 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Jonathan Skinner et al., The Efficiency of Medicare 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8395, 2001).  
 24. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). 
 25. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, The Physician Workforce, 
And Beneficiaries’ Quality Of Care, 2004 Health Aff. W4-184 (web exclusive), http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.184v1. 
 26. Although not a sufficient reason to endorse them, large and centralized social insurance 
programs produce at least one nice externality: a source for consistent and comprehensive data. 
Basing policy responses on analysis of these data is the best we can hope for to improve insurance 
arrangements and related health care. The less unified the system, the more difficult it is to study 
outcomes like quality.  
 27. Elsewhere Hyman provides a synopsis of recent quality studies indicating widespread 
quality problems and concluding that “Medicare is not immune to these problems.” David A. 
Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 Persp. Biology & Med. 55, 57 (2003). 
 28. Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare And Private Insurers: Growth 
Rates In Spending Over Three Decades, Health Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 230. 
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of insurance, however, are likely larger for populations insured by public 
programs such as infants, poor children, and the elderly.29 Amy Finkelstein 
and Robin McKnight are two of the few scholars who address the question 
of Medicare’s value head on. In their article, What Did Medicare Do (And 
Was It Worth It)?, they find that during the program’s first ten years Medi-
care had no discernable effect on elderly mortality, possibly because elderly 
patients with life-threatening conditions had found their way to medical care 
even before Medicare’s implementation.30 They concluded, however, that 
Medicare’s value as an insurance program, one meant to reduce the risk of 
high out-of-pocket spending on health care when it is needed, made it a big 
success. They found that Medicare’s effect on risk exposure alone repre-
sented the equivalent of between one-half and three-quarters of Medicare’s 
costs.31 
IV. Incidence and Inequality 
The book’s final theme is that Medicare is a reverse–Robin Hood 
scheme.32 It takes from the young and the working poor and gives to the re-
tired wealthy (pp. 12–13). How is this so? Although Medicare’s various 
programs are funded differently, overall about 40% of its revenue comes 
from payroll taxes and 41% from general tax revenue (p. 18). Wage taxes 
are flat, not progressive, and they don’t apply to nonwage sources of in-
come. By definition they come from workers, who are younger and poorer 
than Medicare beneficiaries. Only 11% of the program is funded by premi-
ums paid by the elderly beneficiaries who use it and those premiums are not 
means tested (p. 18). Attempts to make affluent elderly patients pay more, 
such as the Catastrophic Coverage Act, have failed miserably (pp. 42–43). 
Hyman’s discussion of Medicare’s distributional effects conflates a few 
separate questions, discussed in turn below: (1) Does Medicare transfer 
money from workers who are young to retirees who are old? Yes, it’s sup-
posed to. (2) Does Medicare transfer monetary value from the poor to the 
rich? It depends on how you count. The rich live longer so they are both 
more likely to become eligible for Medicare at all and to enjoy its benefits 
for more years. But they also pay more taxes than the poor. (3) Is Medicare 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Helen Levy & David Meltzer, What Do We Really Know about Whether Health Insur-
ance Affects Health?, in Health Policy and the Uninsured 179 (Catherine G. McLaughlin ed., 
2004). 
 30. Amy Finkelstein & Robin McKnight, What Did Medicare Do (And Was It Worth It)? 1–2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11609, 2005). 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. According to Hyman, “As a group, the elderly received far more from the public trough 
than they ever paid in (and more than is economically sustainable) even before the MMA, which made 
things substantially worse for younger taxpayers.” P. 41 (citing Eugene Steuerle & Adam Carasso, 
Urban Inst., Lifetime Social Security and Medicare Benefits (2003), available at 
http://urbaninstitute.org/UploadedPDF/310667_Straight36.pdf). Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman 
have recently argued that it is not just public programs but the private health care system that results 
in distributive injustice. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in 
American Health Care, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (2006). 
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inequitable among the old? That is, do the rich beneficiaries get more out of 
the program than do poor beneficiaries? Probably, but the poor show net 
gains too. And (4), how do rich compare to poor beneficiaries in terms of 
health outcomes? Probably better. Unfortunately, the book does not consider 
what are, perhaps, the most important questions for evaluating a social in-
surance scheme: What are the net insurance benefits for the elderly? For the 
poor? For the rich? In other words, how valuable is Medicare insurance in 
terms of risk protection to the elderly, many of whom were uninsured before 
the program was started? 
A. Intergenerational Transfers 
Medicare’s design was based on temporary intergenerational transfers. 
Today’s working young fund the program for retirees. On its face, this de-
sign should not raise distributional concerns because today’s workers are 
tomorrow’s beneficiaries. (The first cohort of Medicare beneficiaries re-
ceived benefits without paying in, but every program needs to start 
somewhere.) Further, today’s workers are paying for today’s quality medical 
care. Given the march of progress, they’ll be quite happy to find that they 
are consuming something much better: tomorrow’s medicine.33 You don’t 
see discount offers on last year’s treatments like you see on last year’s car 
model for a reason.34 
Regardless, analyzing the financial flows of Medicare in isolation is an 
odd exercise. Need every individual public program be neutral among gen-
erations? The elderly don’t benefit much, at least directly, from the Head 
Start programs. They don’t need to go to preschool themselves. (There 
might be considerable indirect benefit to the old from educating the young. 
Toting up the costs and benefits is a tricky business.) The elderly need health 
insurance more than younger workers because, on average, they get sick 
more. Considering total transfers among generations, at least some estimates 
suggest that net financial flows go from parents to children rather than vice 
versa.35 
As the U.S. population ages, however, fewer workers will have to sup-
port an increasingly elderly population. Hyman predicts that the 
“intergenerational pyramid scheme” that is Medicare will get worse and will 
eventually come crashing down (pp. 79–81). This is open to debate. First, 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Havighurst and Richman doubt whether each generation will do better than the last be-
cause the trend depends on continued upward trends in health care costs and life expectancy. 
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 32, at 8 n.1. At this point, I think that we’ve got bigger worries 
than whether health care costs will decline. But they are correct that if Medicare loses support and 
the program is discontinued, today’s workers will not get the benefit of their payments. 
 34. Some think it’s a bad reason. Hyman would like to give consumers more ability to trade 
off cost against quality. See David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the 
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 265, 272 & n.43 
(2006). 
 35. Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: Fairness, 
Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 25 Health Aff. W114, 
W120 (2006) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/3/w114.pdf. 
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whether transfers will indeed get larger depends on how much medicine 
changes over time and how much it will cost. For example, we don’t know 
whether genomic developments will make medicine more or less expensive 
and efficient.36 Second, demographics are not destiny. Whether Medicare, 
like other large social insurance programs, is sustainable depends on eco-
nomic growth. Historically, each successive generation is more productive 
than the last. Even if the next one proves not to be, forecasting fifty years 
and more into the future is a perilous business; neither pessimism nor opti-
mism is justified. 
Hyman advocates restructuring Medicare to avoid these explicit inter-
generational transfers. Doing so will not necessarily help. Unless we are 
willing to let elderly people suffer untreated illness and die without care, 
they will find some way to get it. Cost-shifting will abound. Some elderly 
patients would become eligible for Medicaid, which is funded by state and 
federal taxes that young people also must pay. Others will turn to already 
overburdened public emergency rooms, both for primary care and the grow-
ing number of emergencies that will result. Still others will turn to their 
children for financial help. Increased cost-sharing will also lead to service 
reductions that may in turn cause increased disability and morbidity among 
the elderly. Some children will pay the indirect costs of their parents’ in-
creasing dependence on their attention and care. Younger people, 
particularly taxpayers, will pay one way or another.  
B. Does Medicare Help the Rich get Richer? 
A more troubling issue than intergenerational transfers is how Medicare 
distributes across socioeconomic class. Hyman claims the transfers from the 
poor to the rich are large (pp. 12–13). The evidence is mixed: some find that 
the program redistributes on a financial basis from the rich and educated to 
the poor and poorly educated.37 But there is also plenty of evidence that the 
rich receive more in Medicare benefits than the poor. This is not surprising. 
No one would be stunned to learn that the rich do better than the poor. They 
live longer, so they are both more likely than the poor to reach age sixty-
five—when they become eligible for Medicare—and then to stick around 
even longer while Medicare is paying the bill.38 However, Medicare pay-
ments are only one side of the equation. Richer beneficiaries consume more 
but they also pay more in lifetime taxes than do poorer beneficiaries. 
                                                                                                                      
 36. Medical research and treatments are in the midst of a transformation from anatomy-
based science to a focus on biochemical processes. Any well-functioning health care system will 
have to account for these changes. Harvey Schipper et al., Looking Forward, Moving For-
ward: An Alternative Path for Canada’s Health Care System 5–6 (2003), http:// 
changefoundation.com/ (follow “Online Library” hyperlink; then follow “Archived Reports” hyper-
link). 
 37. Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J. Pub. 
Econ. 277, 278 (2006). 
 38. Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 257, 
258 (2006). 
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Even considering all these factors, “the highest income households re-
ceive[] net benefits (i.e., lifetime expenditures less lifetime taxes) slightly 
higher than those in lower income groups.”39 So on a financial basis, the rich 
do better than the poor. There is some evidence that this gap is shrinking.40 
But we aren’t there yet. Regardless, this conclusion does not provide suffi-
cient reason to tank the program. The poor are receiving net benefits, just 
not as many as the rich.41 Medicare is still worth it for the elderly poor, just 
not as worth it as it could (or should) be. If Hyman is interested in redistrib-
uting wealth, I’ve got a lot of methods more direct and efficient than 
tinkering with the health care system. We should talk. 
In any event, the monetary benefits that flow from Medicare—the main 
concern of Medicare Meets Mephistopheles—are not the only distributional 
issue raised by the Medicare program. As Mark McClellan and Jonathan 
Skinner explain, “dollar flows of money are not the appropriate way to 
judge the value of any social insurance program.”42 Before Medicare was 
enacted, many poor people were uninsured or underinsured. Medicare pro-
vided risk protection to people who were previously unable to get it. So it’s 
important to identify what Medicare provided in terms of insurance value to 
its beneficiaries and to identify “the differential insurance value between 
high and low income households.”43 From this perspective, the results look 
pretty good. Beneficiaries at every level of income show net gains from hav-
ing access to the insurance provided by Medicare and the poor show bigger 
gains than the rich.44 
                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. 
 40. Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and Evolution of Health Inequal-
ity: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Population 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10842, 2004) (“Between 1987 and 2001, we found a dramatic increase in health care expendi-
tures among the lowest income groups, accounting for a 78 percent increase ($2,624) in real terms 
compared to a 34 percent increase ($1,214) for those in the top income decile.”). As the authors 
point out, there are problems with this measure. It could reflect preferences, ill health among the 
poor, access, and spending on things that don’t help. Id.  
 41. At every level of wealth, people pay less in taxes than Medicare spends on their behalf. 
Further, McClellan and Skinner note: 
Medicare effects a modest redistribution from lower income to higher income households . . . . 
The lowest income decile is estimated to receive a net transfer of $978 (for a total generational 
transfer of $27,251), the 3rd decile within-cohort redistribution is –$1,017 (total transfer of 
$25,256), while the highest income decile nets $1,381 (total transfer of $27,654). 
McClellan & Skinner, supra note 38, at 264–65 (internal cross-references omitted). 
 42. Id. at 258. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 270 (“[O]nce again removing the mean intergenerational transfer (in this case, 
$41,254) the intragenerational transfers are tilted toward lower income households. Net intragenera-
tional benefits for the bottom income decile ($8,210) far exceed the net contributions of the highest 
decile (-$4,105).”).  
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C. Health Outcomes 
So far this discussion has been all about whether Medicare transfers 
money and insurance value. What about health? As discussed above, estab-
lishing a causal link between insurance and health outcomes is difficult. 
However, scholars have found that during the 1990s, higher income benefi-
ciaries had greater gains in life expectancy (0.8 years among the highest 
income decile) and more effective medical interventions for various condi-
tions than lower income beneficiaries (0.2 years among the lowest income 
decile).45 Further, “better educated patients get access to newer drugs . . . , 
survive longer following the diagnosis of cancer . . . and comply better with 
regimens for the treatment of AIDS.”46 
This is a problem and there are ways to address it. For example, 
Jonathan Skinner and Weiping Zhou suggest nondiscrimination rules that 
penalize providers for supplying relatively less effective care to low-income 
compared to high-income patients.47 Yet even if these problems can’t be 
solved, do you think poor patients want to give up those life years they 
gained from the program just because someone else got a better deal? 
V. The Market: Heaven on Earth 
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles only briefly attempts to tell us what to 
do about all this. Given Hyman’s anti-government rhetoric, it is surprising 
he doesn’t suggest that we let the entirety of Medicare burn in hell. Rather, 
the book concludes with a short outline of a few policy reforms—and here 
the reader should be warned the Devil has not provided many details—in 
which Hyman makes clear that large command and control programs don’t 
hold much truck for him (Chapter Eleven). He sums up the policy proposals 
under the heading, “Demand Side Conservatism.” The idea is that since it is 
impossible for Big Government to muster the discipline to control health 
care supply it’s better to shrink “the demand for government by empowering 
individual citizens to make their own decisions, and making them more self-
reliant and responsible, and less dependent on government” (p. 87). 
How can government empower its citizens? With incentives that induce 
them to voluntarily limit their spending on medical care. The menu mostly 
consists of familiar fare: replace defined benefits with defined contributions, 
introduce individual health savings accounts (“HSAs”),48 and authorize pri-
vate contracting between patients and doctors to replace publicly negotiated 
and regulated contracts. Consider what these reforms mean and “empower-
ment” begins to look like a bunch of Orwellian doublespeak. To empower 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Skinner & Zhou, supra note 40, at 2. 
 46. Id. at 1 (citations omitted) (citing several studies). 
 47. Id. at 21. 
 48. HSAs are savings accounts, owned by individuals, filled with pretax dollars for the pur-
pose of buying current or future medical care. They are commonly used in conjunction with 
catastrophic coverage insurance plans—plans that cover only very high spending. 
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individuals to function like grownups—that is to make the most of the re-
sources they happen to have in negotiating contracts in a free market—
means to unravel insurance markets, make care too expensive for all but the 
very rich to buy, and let the sick suffer. 
Before making these suggestions, Hyman was spot-on when he hinted 
that insurance should be designed with cost sharing at the front end (pp. 46–
47), both to discourage wasteful spending and because the front end is 
where many people can afford it. Policymakers understand this. This is why 
Medicare beneficiaries are subject to both deductibles and co-payments, 
both of which are already pretty high. In 2007, the deductible for Part A, 
hospital insurance, was $992 (with co-payments for hospital stays at $248 
per day for days 61–90, $496 per day for days 91–150, and then, unfortu-
nately, the beneficiary becomes responsible for all costs).49 
In theory, HSAs coupled with high-deductible insurance plans would 
make patients even more cost-sensitive. In practice it has proven difficult to 
design systems that both make patients cost-sensitive and still insure them 
for big losses.50 Medicare spending is concentrated among a very small per-
centage of beneficiaries. In 2001, 5% of the top spending beneficiaries 
accounted for 43% of total spending, on average $63,000 per person, and 
the top 25% accounted for 85% of annual expenditures.51 Cost sharing 
would have to be untenably high to make much of a dent in this. And how, 
exactly, will that HSA-wielding citizen escape being treated by anything but 
the style of medical care available in his hometown? Patients have a hard 
enough time figuring out which treatment is most likely to help their medi-
cal problem, how are they supposed to judge which one is the most cost-
efficient? Seems like regulation is a better bet. Finally, although the book is 
too sketchy on the details to know what Hyman has in mind, HSAs are typi-
cally inequitable. Because they allow people to spend with pretax money, 
they benefit the rich more than the poor. So much for distributional con-
cerns. 
Insurance is supposed to protect people from the big, unpredictable hits. 
Yet the defined contribution plans that Hyman advocates might very well 
cut people off when the big bills began rolling in. HSAs with high deducti-
bles and catastrophic care are great plans for the healthy and the rich, so 
they would be quite likely to take advantage and opt out of group plans that 
pool risks and make insurance feasible.52 Another of Hyman’s proposals is 
to allow doctors to treat Medicare beneficiaries for covered benefits both 
through the program and by contracting around it. How fast would you like 
                                                                                                                      
 49. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Official U.S. Government Site for People 
with Medicare, http://www.medicare.gov/Updates.asp (follow “2007 Medicare premiums and coin-
surance rates” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). Wealthy people, however, tend to purchase 
supplemental insurance that they use to pay for co-payments and deductibles, creating both ineffi-
ciency and inequity. 
 50. Dahlia K. Remler & Sherry A. Glied, How Much More Cost Sharing Will Health Savings 
Accounts Bring?, 25 Health Aff. 1070, 1074 (2006). 
 51. Cong. Budget Office, High-Cost Medicare Beneficiaries 2 (2005). 
 52. Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 35, at W126. 
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to see risk pools disintegrate? Economically rational doctors would be 
thrilled to sign up the low-risk patients and take their money, leaving the 
actual sick people to get treated elsewhere. The list goes on, but the sugges-
tions add up to risk segmentation and the attendant welfare losses. It is 
likely that Hyman’s proposals will shift the risk from large pools to individ-
ual patients, increase the cost of care for the sick, and restrict the access of 
those who most need treatment. 
Of course, I could be underestimating what the elderly would do with 
their newfound liberation from the nanny state. Unburdened of Medicare’s 
chains, they might start saving. They might analyze insurer, physician, and 
hospital report cards to choose the best providers. They might vote with 
their wallets, buying medicine through insurance plans that give them the 
biggest bang for their buck. They might choose bigger risk pools just to give 
their neighbors a hand. The medical system would then be streamlined, effi-
cient, and a whole lot cheaper. 
This vision may be heavenly, but it is seriously unrealistic. It doesn’t 
take into account how actual human beings behave or how the world of 
health care works. Young and healthy people have little understanding of 
what it is like to be sick, and as a result they often don’t plan for illness. 
Meanwhile, old and sick people are often scared and confused. This doesn’t 
mean people are immature or bad or economically irresponsible. It means 
that they are human. Even those of us with years of specialized training in 
health policy can find it difficult to choose among insurance plans and nego-
tiate in the world of medicine when we or people we love get sick. 
Under the best of circumstances, it is very difficult to evaluate health 
care. After you’ve taken your medicine, it is hard to know whether you got 
better because of the medicine, the skill of the doctor, the passage of time, 
or the luck of the draw.53 Although there have been some developments in 
quality improvement such as increasingly sophisticated report cards and 
pay-for-performance approaches, at least in the short term they have been 
less successful than Hyman suggests. Leemore Dafny and David Dranove 
have shown that Medicare patients respond to report cards ranking Medicare 
                                                                                                                      
 53. When critics of regulation and public health care acknowledge that health care is a merit 
good, they often advocate for service guarantees. See, e.g., Havighurst & Richman, supra note 32, at 
51. For example, they suggest guaranteeing a basic package of care and making the rest of health 
care subject to real markets. Id. In principle this is an elegant solution. In real life, how would this 
work? How do you define essential care? You try it. In these parlor games, cosmetic surgery always 
comes up first. But remember lots of cosmetic surgery goes to burn victims, fixing congenital de-
fects, or breast reconstruction after a mastectomy. Ok, we’re all in agreement: no more using public 
dollars for cosmetic breast augmentation, no more liposuction, no more hair transplants for bald 
men. But those were, of course, never on the list. Look what happened when we tried to get serious 
about deciding on these lists, at least in part, democratically. Oregon tried and what happened? 
There was widespread controversy, alteration to the proposed rankings of services, and ultimately 
little in the way of rationing or cost savings. Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing medical care: 
rhetoric and reality in the Oregon Health Plan, 164 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 1583 (2001). People differ 
regarding what is an important benefit. Hyman and I do. He mocks Massachusetts for mandating 
infertility treatment as part of insurance plans in Massachusetts. David A. Hyman, The Massachu-
setts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Pol’y Analysis, June 28, 2007, at 1, 6, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-595.pdf. Infertility treatment—frivolous or impor-
tant—what do you think? 
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HMOs, but they do so based on the subjective measures of patient satisfac-
tion rather than more objective measures of treatment quality.54 Risk 
adjustment remains hard and the costs of getting it wrong are very high 
since the best way to produce great outcomes is to avoid sick patients and 
treat healthy ones. Pay-for-performance systems haven’t, at least yet, proved 
to be very effective.55 They also tend to disadvantage poor patients and racial 
minorities.56 These are just a few of the problems with embracing a market 
model and abandoning regulation.  
Yet Hyman wonders why “almost no one has asked why the form of 
price setting used by the government in other parts of procurement (com-
petitive bidding) is effectively nonexistent in Medicare” (p. 22). States have 
experimented with competitive bidding with limited success.57 But as 
Hyman explains, federal efforts have had trouble even getting off the 
ground, in part because interest groups such as private insurers opposed the 
programs.58 On the other hand, competitive bidding has been more success-
fully used for purchasing durable medical equipment. That’s because buying 
wheelchairs and canes through a competitive process is a lot more straight-
forward than buying health care.  
Even if political opposition could be overcome, it is unclear whether 
merely increasing competition absent extensive regulation would get what 
Hyman wants. The most recent efforts to introduce more competition into 
Medicare have provided beneficiaries with more choices among health in-
surance plans, but they have also increased Medicare spending and 
increased the likelihood of fragmenting risk pools.59 Further, where quality 
is hard to measure, even ex post, competition doesn’t necessarily improve 
quality.60 There is a small industry of scholarly work that explains all the 
ways health care markets deviate from ordinary markets, with more detail 
                                                                                                                      
 54. Leemore S. Dafny & David Dranove, Do Report Cards Tell Consumers Anything They 
Don’t Already Know? The Case of Medicare HMOs 28–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 11420, 2005). 
 55. See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein, Pay for Performance at the Tipping Point, 356 New Eng. J. 
Med. 515 (2007); Meredith B. Rosenthal & Richard G. Frank, What Is the Empirical Basis for 
Paying for Quality in Health Care?, 63 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 135, 151–53 (2006). 
 56. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Will Pay-For-Performance And Quality Reporting Affect 
Health Care Disparities?, 26 Health Aff. W405 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/3/w405. 
 57. Several states have experimented with competitive bidding in their Medicaid programs. 
The results have been mixed and the potential for long-term savings uncertain. See, e.g., Lynn 
Paringer & Nelda McCall, How Competitive Is Competitive Bidding?, Health Aff., Winter 1991, 
at 220. 
 58. Pp. 55–56 (citing Bryan Dowd et al., A Tale Of Four Cities: Medicare Reform And Com-
petitive Pricing, Health Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 9); see also Len M. Nichols & Robert D. 
Reischauer, Who Really Wants Price Competition In Medicare Managed Care?, Health Aff., 
Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 30. 
 59. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage In 2006-2007: What Congress Intended?, 26 Health 
Aff. W445, W454 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/4/w445. 
 60. Cutler, supra note 9, at 26. 
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than I can offer here.61 Suffice it to say that health care is not a typical com-
modity and treating it as such would bring dire consequences. 
Perhaps Medicare Meets Mephistopheles’ most disconcerting prescrip-
tion is its plan to address distributional injustice via means testing. Making 
the rich elderly pay more for their care than they now do seems compelling 
in a world with limited resources. But Hyman is nothing if not politically 
astute. He knows that extensive means testing will transform Medicare into 
a program for the poor elderly. And “[o]nce the Medicare program does not 
include all the elderly, it becomes much easier for legislators to impose sig-
nificant funding and benefit cuts, and the political punch of pro-Medicare 
demagoguery becomes much less powerful when all that is at stake is the 
health and welfare of poor people” (p. 89). Segregate the poor and then cut 
their benefits. 
Maybe it’s the Devil who helps those who help themselves (and only 
themselves). Never taking the idea of solidarity seriously, Hyman mocks 
those who embrace such ideas for “their continued willingness to guzzle 
communitarian Kool-Aid” (p. 70). Hyman, though, has perhaps guzzled his 
own flavor of Kool-Aid; regardless of the benefits of universal insurance for 
the elderly, either in the form of political unity or spillover benefits, practi-
cal politics will stop the Devil in his tracks. There is no way on God’s green 
earth that the current generation of wealthy, elderly beneficiaries is going to 
permit their Medicare benefits to be cut. 
In 1969, Harold Demsetz coined the term “nirvana approach” to de-
scribe a faulty form of public policy analysis in which the analyst notes that 
perfect markets would produce a particular result, observes that actual mar-
kets aren’t perfect, and therefore concludes that government should step in 
to regulate them.62 In Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, Hyman engages in 
something like a reverse nirvana fallacy. He notes that perfect markets 
would produce a particular result, observes that Medicare isn’t perfect, and 
therefore concludes that we should let actual markets reign to reach his de-
sired result. Yet Hyman’s idea of actual markets is decidedly idealistic. And, 
according to Demsetz, the relevant policy choice is between “alternative real 
institutional arrangements,” not between “an ideal norm and an existing 
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.”63 To consider whether Medicare or a 
market-based alternative is the better way to go, we need to consider the 
market alternative with all its warts—the inevitable moral hazard and ad-
verse selection, the rampant externalities, the incentives for providers to 
skimp on quality, and human weakness. 
This is why Medicare Meets Mephistopheles is a terrific overview of a 
troubled system, but a missed opportunity to help reform Medicare. Provid-
ing health care fairly and efficiently is a complicated process that 
                                                                                                                      
 61. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7176, 1999). 
 62. Harold Demsetz, Information and Inefficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1 
(1969). 
 63. Id. at 1. 
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necessarily involves a heavy dose of government. Libertarian railing against 
big government, regulation, and all lefty foolishness that market proponents 
despise doesn’t get one very far in determining how to get health care to 300 
million people. In the end Hyman doesn’t offer any realistic alternative to 
this government-regulated muddle because, God knows, his plans are unac-
ceptable anywhere but in hell. 
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